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Abstract
Following a tradition that relates household-level shocks to educational attainment, we ex-
amine the impact of teacher-level shocks on student learning. As a plausible measure for these
shocks, we use teacher absenteeism during a 30-day recall period. Shocks that result in a 5-
percent increase in teacher absence rate reduced learning by 4 to 8 percent of average gains
over the year, for both the subjects of Mathematics and English. The estimated impacts are
substantial and, in addition to the losses due to time away from class, likely reflect lower teach-
ing quality when in class and less lesson-preparation when at home. We document that health
problems–primarily their own illness and the illnesses of family members—account for more
than 60 percent of teacher absenteeism, which is not surprising in a country struggling with an
HIV/AIDS epidemic. This suggests both that households are unable to substitute adequately
for school-level teaching inputs and that, to support human capital formation, insurance at the
school-level may be a policy priority that is worth exploring further.
1 Introduction
The relationship between schooling inputs and educational outcomes continues to receive wide
attention in discussions about how to improve educational outcomes. Educational investment,
particularly in poor countries, depends a good deal on publicly provided resources to schools.
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However, it is also influenced by inputs at the household level. For some resources, such as textbooks
and other educational materials, parents are able to substitute at home what is not provided in the
school. For other resources, such substitution may be harder.
Consensus is building that teachers constitute a school-level resource that parents find hard to
substitute for at home. It is possible that parents do not have the time or skills to teach their
children at home. Further, the agency costs of hiring teachers in a market may be high and such
costs may be accentuated due to low overall levels of learning in low-income countries. Perhaps not
surprisingly then, the literature consistently finds that teachers contribute significantly to levels
and growth in learning achievement; however, considerable debate continues about the specific
attributes of teachers that matter.
A key problem has been identification; in particular, it is hard to separate the eﬀects of house-
hold resources from school inputs on learning achievement. Parallel work on the contribution of
households focus on how household-level shocks aﬀect educational attainment (two examples are
Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; de Janvry and others 2005). To our knowledge though, there has been
little work on how school-level shocks might aﬀect learning achievement, even though it provides a
means of identifying the impact of school resources.
We address this gap by examining the eﬀect of shocks that teachers faced on student learning.
The study focuses on Zambia, where the impact of AIDS and other illnesses seem to be the reason
for much of the observed absenteeism of teachers.1 The paper isolates the eﬀect of the shocks
that teachers face during an academic year–primarily their own illness and the illnesses of family
members–on student learning. These shocks, as measured by episodes of teacher absence, led to
large losses in learning achievement. A shock associated with a 5 percent increase in teacher absence
reduced learning achievement by 4 to 8 percent of average gains in English and Mathematics during
the academic year studied. The size of the estimated impact is substantial and, in addition to the
losses due to time away from class, probably reflects lower teaching quality when in class and less
lesson-preparation when at home.
The impact is robust to controls for student absenteeism. The estimated impact of student
absenteeism is of the same magnitude as the eﬀect of teacher-level shocks. Since every teacher
teaches many students this raises the possibility that, to support human capital formation, providing
insurance at the school-level may be a policy priority worth exploring further. The protective eﬀect
of such insurance could have larger impacts on learning achievement than insuring and supporting
1This is in marked contrast to say, India, where incentives to teachers to perform well seem to be the reason for
absenteeism and hence the nature of the problem and its impact are considerably diﬀerent.
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students and their families. Moreover, in countries with a high HIV/AIDS burden, substantial
welfare gains could accrue through a reduction in the frequency or impact of shocks associated
with absenteeism. For example, Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003) posit huge declines in human
capital due to the eﬀects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on aﬀected economies. The results presented
in this paper provide strong micro-foundations for this assumption and challenge conclusions that
find a small (or no) impact of the HIV epidemic on the education sector (Bennell 2005).
To contextualize our empirical results, we present a model where households determine the
optimal path of educational attainment given teacher and other school inputs (Das and others 2004).
In this framework, teachers possess three attributes—observable characteristics (age, gender and
experience), unobserved non-time varying attributes (such as ability or motivation) and unobserved
time varying attributes (such as the health status). As households try to optimize over future time
periods, they face uncertainty related to two school-based inputs: uncertainty in the quality of the
teacher (non-time varying) and timing and severity of shocks to the teacher (time-varying).
The model shows how variation in the non-time varying and time-varying attributes aﬀect learn-
ing achievement. It thus allows us to advance the prominent role of households in determining their
children’s cognitive achievement. In addition, it clarifies the identification assumptions required to
estimate the impact of teacher-level shocks on student learning. In particular, one contribution
is to show that the impact of teacher-level shocks on learning is identified only if non-time vary-
ing heterogeneity for both students and teachers is adequately dealt with through the estimation
procedure.
The empirical results are based on a rich teacher-student matched data set from Zambia that
we collected in 2002. In addition to school, teacher, and student characteristics, the data includes
test scores for a sample of pupils over two years. This panel of test scores allows us to deal with
omitted variable bias associated with student tracking, but does not account for unobserved changes
in teacher characteristics. To do so, we exploit a tradition in which some teachers stay with the
same student cohort throughout primary school. By restricting attention to the sample of pupils
with the same teacher in both years, and this is the basis of our identification strategy, we address
concerns that arise from unobserved child and teacher heterogeneity.
For students who remained with the same teacher, there is a large and significant eﬀect of
negative shocks to the teacher on learning. This result is robust across specifications. It is also
robust to a number of identification problems common to estimating the impact of school inputs
on learning, which we discuss below. However, the results obtained on the sample of students who
remained with the same teacher do not extend to those who switched teachers during the two years
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of the study. We suggest two reasons for this finding. The first is selective matching of students
and teachers, and the second is higher precautionary educational spending among households whose
children switched teachers. Although we are able to show that the diﬀerential impact among the
movers and non-movers did not arise from diﬀerences in the sample of students, we are unable to
distinguish between these two suggested channels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 outlines the theory. Section 4 presents the empirical specification and econometric concerns.
Section 5 discusses the data used and section 6 presents the results and robustness tests for the
sample of children who stayed with the same teacher. Section 7 focuses on the sample of children
who switched teachers and section 8 concludes with some caveats and a discussion of the policy
implications.
2 Literature Review
Interest in teacher attributes on student learning has recently emerged in the educational production
function literature. Papers using analysis of variance techniques have shown that the variation in
test scores explained by teachers is substantial. Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (1998), using data
from Tennessee schools, find evidence of significant teacher eﬀects. Park and Hannum (2002),
using student-teacher matched data from China, find that variation due to teacher eﬀects explains
about 25 percent of variation in test scores. More traditional regression-based studies also validate
this finding. Rockoﬀ (2004) using a 12-year panel of teacher-student data from two school districts
in New Jersey finds significant teacher fixed eﬀects. A one standard deviation change in the teacher
fixed eﬀect (unobserved quality) is associated with gains in Mathematics and reading of 0.26 and
0.16 standard deviations respectively. Less is known about the specific attributes of teachers that
aﬀect student learning. Limited evidence on teacher experience and training is provided by Rockoﬀ
(2004) and Angrist and Lavy (2001), who find that both experience and training have a positive
impact on learning achievement.
Closer to the results presented here are the studies by Jacobson (1989) and Ehrenberg and
others (1991). Jacobson (1989) describes an interesting policy experiment in which a pot of money
was set aside and teachers’ claims on the pot were proportional to sick leave days not taken. This
policy reduced the number of sick days taken by 30 percent and increased the share of teachers
with perfect attendance from 8 percent to 34 percent.2 Data was not available to evaluate the
2 Interestingly though, the courts decided not to implement the incentive scheme for a second year since it resulted
in a large number of "walking-wounded"–teachers who came into work despite being sick!
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impact of this policy on student performance. Ehrenberg and others (1991) study the eﬀect of
teacher absenteeism on school level pass-rates using variation in school district leave policies as an
instrument for absenteeism. They find no direct eﬀects of absenteeism on pass-rates, although they
do find that higher teacher absenteeism is associated with higher student absenteeism.
Our paper focuses on identifying the impact of negative shocks on learning achievement using
absenteeism as a plausible measure of shocks rather than the impact of absenteeism per se. Negative
shocks that result in higher absenteeism may also lead to less supplementary inputs by the teacher.
A teacher who is sick is likely to be absent more often and also likely to spend less time on lesson
preparation. Our estimates thus capture the joint eﬀect of absence from the classroom and lower
inputs due to the shock. The policy implications (discussed below) vary accordingly.
The institutional context presents another source of diﬀerence. It is likely that the nature
and severity of shocks that teachers experience varies dramatically across the United States and
low-income countries. In a country like Zambia, with very high HIV prevalence, shocks due to
illnesses and funerals can lead to long absences and substantial declines in teaching performance.
The diﬀerence in absenteeism is striking. Absence rates in U.S.-based studies of 5 percent (or in
Jacobson’s case an average of 7 days per year) are low compared to those in low-income countries–
an ongoing study finds averages of 20 percent and above in Sub-Saharan Africa, 25 percent in India
and 11 percent and above in Latin America (Chaudhury and Hammer 2005; Chaudhury and others
2004; World Bank 2003; Glewwe and others 2001).3 In Zambia, the percentage of teachers absent
from school at the time of a surprise visit was closer to 18 percent and average days of absence
fall just under 21 days during the year.4 In addition, in the U.S. the policy of providing substitute
teachers minimizes disruption. Although evidence on teacher absenteeism in low income countries
is sparse, the use of substitute teachers is low. Thus, both the extent of shocks and the ability of
schools to cope is accentuated in our data.
Finally, the impact of teacher shocks is identified only for the sample of children who remained
with the same teacher over two years. For children who changed teachers between the first and the
second year of the study, heterogeneity in non-time varying teacher attributes such as motivation,
confounds the interpretation of the estimate. This requires data that matches specific students and
teachers, a requirement that is hard to fulfill in most countries; Ehrenberg and others (1991) for
instance use district level data, which could partially explain the lack of a relationship between
teacher absence and student learning in their study.
3 In fact, even private sector absence in India at 10 percent is double that reported for public schools in the US.
4Note that this one-time measure is unable to distinguish between teachers who are frequently absent from those
who are absent infrequently.
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3 Theory
The model is based on Das and others (2004a). It is extended here to explicitly focus on the
implications of uncertainty in teacher inputs on household decisions about educational inputs and
cognitive achievement, as measured by test scores. The model assumes a household (with a sin-
gle child attending school) that derives (instantaneous) utility from the cognitive achievement of
the child TS and the consumption of other goods X. The household maximizes an intertemporal
utility function U(.), additive over time and states of the world with discount rate β(< 1) subject
to an intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) relating assets in the current period to assets in the
previous period, current expenditure and current income. Finally, cognitive achievement is deter-
mined by a production function relating current achievement (TSt) to past achievement (TSt−1),
household educational inputs (zt), teacher inputs (mt), non-time varying child characteristics (µ)
and non time-varying teacher and school characteristics (η). We impose the following structure on
preferences and the production function for cognitive achievement:
[A1] Household utility is additively separable, increasing, and concave in cognitive achievement
and other goods.
[A2] The production function for cognitive achievement is given by TSt = F (TSt−1,mt, zt, µ, η)
where F (.) is concave in its arguments.
Under [A1] and [A2] the household problem is
Max(Xt,zt) Uτ = Eτ
T[
t=τ
βt−τ [u(TSt) + v(Xt)] s.t. (1)
At+1 = (1 + r).(At + yt − PtXt − zt) (2)
TSt = F (TSt−1,mt, zt, µt, η) (3)
AT+1 = 0 (4)
Here u and v are concave in each of its arguments. The intertemporal budget constraint (2) links
asset levels At+1 at t+1 with initial assets At, private spending on educational inputs zt, income yt
and the consumption of other goods Xt. The price of educational inputs is the numeraire, the price
of other consumption goods is Pt, and r is the interest rate. The production function constraint (3)
dictates how inputs are converted to educational outcomes and the boundary condition (4) requires
that at t = T the household must have zero assets so that all loans are paid back and there is no
bequest motive.5
5As discussed in Das et al. (2004a), an alternative assumption, that the benefits from the child’s cognitive
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We assume that teacher inputs consist of two parts, and both are outside the control of the
household–inputs conditional on quality mqt and shocks to these inputs µt. The shocks are zero
in expectation (E(µt) = 0) so that mt = m
q
t + µt. Teacher inputs conditional on quality m
q
t are
assumed to be unknown, but at the time the household makes its decision it knows the underlying
distribution of quality and the stochastic process related to µt (but not the actual level). The two
sources of uncertainty in this model are uncertainty about the quality of teachers and uncertainty
about shocks to teacher inputs.
Maximization of (1) subject to (2) and (3) provides a decision rule related to TSt, characterizing
the demand for cognitive achievement. To arrive at this decision rule, we define a price for cognitive
achievement as the “user-cost” of increasing the stock in one period by one unit, i.e., the relevant
(shadow) price in each period for the household. This user-cost, evaluated at period t is (see Das
and others (2004a)):
πt =
1
Fzt(.)
− FTSt(.)
(1 + r)Fzt+1(.)
(5)
The first term measures the cost of taking resources at t and transforming it into one extra mark in
the test. When implemented through a production function, the price is no longer constant–if the
production function is concave, the higher the initial levels of cognitive achievement, the greater the
cost of buying an extra unit as reflected in the marginal value, Fzt(.). Of the additional unit bought
in period t, the amount left to sell in period t+1 is FTSt(.) and the second term thus measures the
present value of how much of this one unit will be left in the next period expressed in monetary
terms. The standard first-order Euler condition related to the optimal path of educational outcomes
between period t and t+ 1 is then:
∂U
∂TSt
πt
= βEt
# ∂U
∂TSt+1
πt+1
$
(6)
Intuitively this expression (ignoring uncertainty for the moment) suggests that if the user-cost of
test scores increases in one period t + 1 relative to t, along the optimal path this would increase
the marginal utility at t+1, so that TSt+1 will be lower. This is a standard Euler equation stating
that along the optimal path, cognitive achievement will be smooth, so that the marginal utilities of
educational outcomes will be equal in expectations, appropriately discounted and priced. Finally,
the concavity of the production function will limit the willingness of households to boost education
achievement are only felt in the future, would not change the model. Moreover, the results are unaﬀected if one
assumes that households care about the (instantaneous) flow from educational outcomes (rather than the stock of
cognitive achievement) provided that this flow is linear in the stock.
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“too rapidly” since the cost is increasing in household inputs. Thus, under reasonable restrictions,
the optimal path will be characterized by a gradual increase in educational achievement over time
(for an explicit derivation see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; and Foster 1995).
This general framework allows us to make predictions about the impact of information about
teacher quality and of shocks to teacher inputs. First, any shock in teacher inputs will aﬀect the
path of test scores over time. Secondly, uncertainty ex ante about teacher quality may result in
fluctuations ex post in outcomes. For example, if at t+ 1 teacher quality is better than expected,
then households will have relatively overspent on educational inputs, boosting outcomes in t + 1
beyond the anticipated smooth path. It also implies that the (ex post observable) change in teacher
quality between t and t+1 matters for describing the change in outcomes and these changes should
be included in an empirical specification.
The uncertainty faced by households may also result in ex ante responses, aﬀecting outcomes
as well as the impact of shocks on outcomes. To see this, consider the first-order condition aﬀecting
choices between spending on educational inputs and on other goods before teacher quality is known.
The optimal decision rule equates the marginal utility of spending on other goods to the expected
value of spending on educational inputs (taking into account the intertemporal decision rule in (6)),
or:
∂U
∂Xt
Pt
= Et−1
#
∂U
∂TSt
πt
$
(7)
In general, whether increased risk in teacher quality will increase or reduce household spending
on educational inputs will depend on risk preferences and the nature and shape of the cognitive
production function. In particular, given Pt, if increasing risk increases the right-hand side of
equation (7), households will spend less on other goods Xt and more on teaching inputs zt than
before. Two implications emerge. First, the expected path of educational outcomes would be
higher–although this will not necessarily have an impact on the changes in outcomes between two
periods. Secondly, the ex post impact of shocks to teacher inputs in a particular period may be
diﬀerent depending on the extent of risk faced by households ex ante.6
Appendix 2 develops the circumstances under which an increase in the ex-ante risk faced by
households leads to a decrease in the impact of ex post shocks due to a commensurate increase in
6Note that the latter possibility only arises due to the fact that households may influence educational outcomes
via their own inputs; if outcomes were only produced by teacher inputs, then there would be no diﬀerence in observed
outcomes conditional on the uncertainty faced by parents about teacher quality, since ex ante no actions could have
been taken to avoid this.
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ex ante household investment. For the environment studied in this paper, this implies that the
sample of students who switched teachers (and thus faced greater uncertainty regarding teacher
quality) would be less susceptible to shocks in teacher inputs, for instance through the teacher’s or
her families ill health. Note that this diﬀerence in the estimated impact of the shock arises even
if movers are randomly assigned to teachers. Thus, to the extent the households increase their ex
ante educational investment due to precautionary motives, we expect to find a larger coeﬃcient of
teacher-level shocks on student learning for children who stayed with the same teacher compared
to children who switched.7 8
4 Empirical Model and Identification
To derive an empirical specification, as in Das and others (2004), the following assumptions are
required.
[fA1] Household utility is additively separable and of the CRRA form.
[fA2] TSt = (1− δ)TSt−1 + F (wt, zt, µ, η) where the Hessian of F (.) is negative semi-definite.
Under assumption [fA1] (6) can be written as:
TSt
TSt−1
−ρβπt−1
πt
= 1 + et (8)
where et is an expectation error, uncorrelated with information at t−1. Taking logs, the expression
for child i is:
ln

TSit
TSit−1

=
1
ρ
lnβ − 1
ρ
ln(
πit
πit−1
) +
1
ρ
ln(1 + eit) (9)
or, the growth path is determined by the path of user-costs, and a term capturing expectational
surprises.
7This result may at first seem counter intuitive: Producing cognitive achievement using household inputs is a
risky activity. So, responding to increased risk by spending more on the risky activity may go against the basic results
discussed in Sandmo (1969). However, since the produced commodity also enters the utility function, these results
do not hold, and under reasonable conditions, households may choose to invest more in the activity in response to
more uncertainty, as a means of guaranteeing a reasonable amount of the produced commodity for consumption.
The argument is similar to the analysis of precautionary savings, where the choice is between consuming more today
compared to tomorrow, as in Deaton (1992). In the basic model, convexity of marginal utility is then suﬃcient for
increased savings in response to increased uncertainty in income, even though the risk related to future utility has
increased, aﬀecting the marginal benefit to savings.
8 If the price of boosting cognitive achievement were constant, then convexity of marginal utility is suﬃcient. If
not, then as long as user-costs increase only at a decreasing rate in teacher inputs, households will still spend more
on household-level educational inputs when risk increases. In this formulation credit markets are perfect so that
there are no bounds on At+1 apart from (4); the perfect credit market assumption is relaxed in our discussion of the
empirical results. To see how the theory is aﬀected, see Das et al. (2004a).
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The key issue is how changes in the two types of teacher inputs mqt and µt impact the optimal
path of cognitive achievement. To provide a direct measure of the impact of shocks in teacher inputs
on the growth path of cognitive achievement, we add a direct measure of the shock in Equation
(9). If there is an (unanticipated) shock µt to teacher inputs ex post, then the change in the growth
path is given by ln(TSt−1+µtFmTSt−1 ), which depends on the relative size of the terms in brackets. In
light of the above, our empirical specification is given by:
ln

TSijkt
TSijkt−1

= αo + α1µjkt + α2∆tjkt + α3∆Xjkt + {∆mqt + ijkt} (10)
where TSijkt is the test score of child i with teacher j in school k at time t; µjkt is a measure of a
shock to teacher inputs of teacher j in school k; ∆tjkt represents a vector of changes in observable
teacher characteristics and ∆Xjkt represents a vector of changes in other variables thought to aﬀect
the relative user-cost of boosting cognitive achievement. The more negative is α1, the larger the
impact of shocks on test scores. Finally, the error term consists of changes to unobserved teacher
characteristics ∆mqt and a child-level shock ijkt.
4.1 Identification Among "Non-Movers"
The identification assumption implicit in Equation(10) is that cov(µjkt, {∆mqt +εijkt}) = 0, i.e, the
error term in the equation is not correlated with teacher-level shocks. Consider the non-movers
sample first. For this sample, ∆mqt = 0 so that fα1 is identified if cov(µjkt, ijkt) = 0, i.e., teacher-
level shocks are orthogonal to student-level shocks. This assumption breaks down if, for instance,
the shocks that teachers are susceptible to are covariate with shocks that students face–a drought
in a village would likely aﬀect both student and teachers equally, biasing our results away from
zero.
There is also an additional specification error if households are unable to substitute for teaching
inputs. In this case, unobserved teacher characteristics still have a persistent eﬀect on student
performance and mqt will enter independently in the error term of Equation (10) above. While
the Euler model considered here explicitly rules out such persistence (for instance, through lagged-
stock adjustment), we discuss the robustness of our results to the omitted-variables and specification
errors below.
4.2 Identification Among "Movers"
For the sample of movers, an additional source of bias is introduced through selective matching.
Thus, if cov(∆mqt , µjkt) 9= 0, so that the change in unobserved teacher quality is correlated with
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teacher-level shocks, then α1 captures both the eﬀect of shocks and changes in teacher quality for
the movers. If children who changed teachers (movers) did so from very bad to bad teachers (so
that ∆mqt is positive), but these (unobservably) bad teachers are more absent than the average in
the sample, the covariance condition implies that our estimated impact for the movers is biased
towards zero. Note that there is a diﬀerence in interpretation between the selective matching and
the precautionary spending channel developed in the theory and appendix 2. For the latter, even
when cov(∆mqt , µjkt) = 0 so that there is no bias in the coeﬃcient, the impact of teacher shocks is
still closer to zero for the sample of movers–this is due to heterogeneity in the treatment impact
and accordingly has diﬀerent estimation implications.
Estimating the impact of teacher shocks requires data both on the extent of these shocks and a
means of distinguishing the uncertainty faced by households in terms of teacher inputs. The primary
measure of shocks to teacher inputs used in this paper is teacher absenteeism. As will be shown
below, this absenteeism arises from a number of factors, largely unpredictable for the households,
such as illness and attendance at funerals. We first estimate the impact of teacher shocks for the
non-movers and discuss the robustness of our results to the concerns raised above. We then show
that the results do not extend to the sample of movers. We are unable, however, to distinguish
between the selective matching (which results in a bias in the estimates) and precautionary spending
(which results in heterogeneity in the impact of teacher shocks) channels.
5 Data
The data are from Zambia, a landlocked country with a population of 10 million in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The educational environment is discussed in some detail in Das and others (2004a) and Das
and others (2004b). For our purposes, an important factor is the overall decline in GDP per capita
in the country from the mid-1970s due to a decline in worldwide copper prices, the country’s main
export (per-capita income declined almost 5 percent annually between 1974 and 1990). The decline
in per capita income has had an impact on educational attainment. For instance, net primary
school enrolment currently at 72 percent is historically low, following a moderate decline over the
previous decade. Although the government responded to deterioration in the education profile with
an investment program at the primary and “basic” level in 2000, a continuing problem has been
the inability of the government to hire and retain teachers in schools.
An exacerbating factor is the HIV/AIDS epidemic. A recent report (Grassly and others 2003)
calculates that the number of teachers lost to HIV/AIDS has increased from 2 per day in 1996 to
4 or more a day in 1998, representing two-thirds of each years output of newly trained teachers.
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Not surprisingly, teacher attrition has received a lot of attention, both in the popular press and
in institutional reports (our data and that from the census of schools in 2002 corroborates the
high rates of attrition (Das and others 2004b)). Further, absenteeism rates are high, primarily
due to illness and funerals. Grassly and others (2003) for instance, find that absenteeism arising
from illness-related reasons will lead to the loss of 12,450 teacher-years over the next decade. The
resulting teacher-shortage has led to class sizes above the 40 children per teacher norm (particularly
in rural areas), teachers teaching double shifts, and limited possibilities for substitutions when
teachers are absent.
In 2002 we surveyed 182 schools in four provinces of the country.9 The choice of schools was
based on a probability-proportional-to-size sampling scheme, where each of 35 districts in the four
provinces was surveyed and schools were randomly chosen within districts with probability weights
determined by grade 5 enrollment in the school year 2001. Thus, every enrolled student in grade 5
in the district had an equal probability of being in a school that participated in the survey. As part
of the survey, questionnaires were administered to teachers and head-teachers with information on a
host of topics including their demographics, personal characteristics, absenteeism, outside options
and classroom conditions. In addition, we also collected information at the level of the school
including financing and the receipts of educational inputs during the academic year. Of these 182
schools, we use 177 for our analysis–for two schools we do not have the relevant school information,
and examiners regarded the test scores for three schools in the first year as suspect.
An extensive module linking teacher characteristics to student performance formed an integral
part of the survey. As part of this student-teacher matching we collected information on the
identity of each student’s teacher in the current (2002) and the previous year (2001). Based on
this information, we can identify the non-movers in 2001 and 2002; this sub-sample represents 26
percent of the students tested both in 2001 and 2002. We administered a questionnaire to all
matched teachers present on the day of the survey, resulting in information on 541 teachers in 182
schools. Every teacher interviewed is hence matched to a student, either by virtue of currently
teaching the student or having taught the student in the previous year. We collected information
on the current teacher for 85 percent of the students and on the past teacher for 62 percent of these
students since some teachers had left the school.10 Consequently our sample drops as we include
present and past teacher controls. Moreover, this change is probably not random–particularly in
9Lusaka, Northern, Copperbelt and Eastern provinces were surveyed. These four provinces account for 58 percent
of the total population in Zambia.
10As in a number of other countries in the region, student teachers are typically used to teach a class for a year
before returning to teacher training college to complete their training.
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the case of the present teacher, it is very likely that we do not have information on those who are
prone to high absenteeism.
To assess learning achievement, a maximum of 20 students in grade 5 were randomly chosen
from every school in 2001 and an achievement test was administered in Mathematics and English.11
The same tests were administered in 2002 to the same students leading to the construction of a
two-year panel of test scores. Sampled children were also asked to complete a student questionnaire
in every year with information on basic assets and demographic information for the household.
Our source of variation for shocks to teacher inputs is variation in teacher absenteeism, where
absence is defined as a teacher being away from school during regular school hours.12 Unfortunately,
schools in Zambia (and in most other low-income countries) do not maintain records of teacher’s
time away from school. To the extent that such records are available, they tend to under-estimate
absence by 5-10 percent (Chaudhury and others 2004). Our information on absences is instead
based on three diﬀerent measures that we collected as part of the school survey; spot absence,
self-reported absence during the last 30 days and the head-teacher’s report of teacher absence
during the last 30 days. The most satisfactory measure is the head teacher’s report, whereby
head teachers provided independent reports of teacher absence over the last 30 days for the entire
matched teacher sample. As an indicator for teacher shocks, this is clearly a noisy measure and as
usual, measurement error implies that our estimates are likely to be biased towards zero.13
Table 1 summarizes the school, teacher and student samples. The schools are evenly divided
among rural and urban locations, with an average of 23 teachers teaching 912 pupils in every school.
There are more female teachers, the majority have teaching certificates and about half have been
teaching for five years or more. Absenteeism is a big problem. Head-teachers reported that 304
out of 725 teachers were absent at least once during the last month. Two-thirds of the students
live with both parents (7 percent of the children had lost both parents, and another 14 percent
had lost one parent), and parental education is relatively high–a majority of the mothers reported
studying to levels “more than primary schooling” and among fathers, this proportion increases
to 72 percent. Despite the high levels of parental and teacher education, learning gains over the
11 In schools with less than 20 students in grade 5, the entire grade was sampled.
12 Ideally we would like to measure the time that teachers spend away from the classroom when they should be
teaching. This would include absence episodes while teachers are in school. Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin.(2001) find
that teachers are in school but absent from class 12 percent of the time. We focus only on time away from school.
13Absences and their reasons are broadly similar for diﬀerent methods used to collect absenteeism data. Appendix
1 provides a discussion of these alternative measures.Despite the measurement error associated with a 30-day recall
period as a measure of year-long shocks, there are established precedents in household surveys. Most household
survey modules on illness, for instance, restrict themselves to recall periods of 30-days or less. Nevertheless, these
measures have been extensively used and validated in the literature on health and economic outcomes.
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academic year were low. On average, children answered only 3.2 questions more in Mathematics
from a starting point of 17.2 correct answers (from 45 questions) and 2.4 more in English starting
from 11.1 correct answers (from 33 questions). In terms of the standardized score, children gained
0.42 standard deviations in Mathematics and 0.40 in English.14
Table 2 summarizes our data on head-teacher reports of absenteeism. Teacher illness accounted
for 35 percent of all absence episodes, and illnesses in the family and funerals for another 27
percent, suggesting that health-related issues are a major source of shocks to teacher inputs. The
head-teacher reported a median absence duration of two days for teacher and family illness and
three days for funerals.
Table 3 disaggregates the teacher and student characteristics by “more” and “less” absent teach-
ers, restricting attention to the sample of non-movers (table 1 in appendix 3 provides a similar table
for the full sample). While there are some diﬀerences in teacher characteristics, these diﬀerences
are not significant at the usual confidence levels. In terms of student characteristics, there are no
diﬀerences between the students with less and more absent teachers (an exception is the propor-
tion of students that live within 15 minutes of their schools). Note in particular, that there is no
statistically significant diﬀerence in the number of days the student was absent (1.42 versus 1.47)
across less and more absent teachers. Finally, the characteristics of the sample change somewhat
as we progressively exclude those teachers and students on whom we have no information–those
excluded tend on average to be male teachers and teachers in rural areas.
Table 4 shows diﬀerences between non-movers and movers: Schools with non-movers are larger
and are more urban. These diﬀerences are significant at the usual levels. Teachers who teach non-
movers are more urban (significant), female (significant), more experienced (significant) and have
more training (significant). Similarly, there a significant diﬀerences in the student characteristics.
Non-movers are more likely to be living with both parents (insignificant), have a higher proportion
of mothers and fathers with primary or higher education (significant), are 0.3 standard deviations
richer than movers (significant) and have higher test scores in 2001 (significant). In essence, the
sample of non-movers is primarily urban. We examine the implications in Section 7.
14We used item response theory methods to arrive at a scaled score for every student; essentially the method
constructs optimal weights for every question and estimates a latent variable, interpreted as the ”knowledge” of the
child, using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Diﬀerencing across the base and final year, the estimated
change in ”knowledge” is used as the dependent variable in our regressions (see Das and others 2004a for details). The
distribution of knowledge in the base year is standardized to have mean zero and variance 1, so that the coeﬃcients
of the regression can be interpreted as the impact of the independent variable on standard deviations of estimated
(change in) knowledge.
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6 Results: Non-Movers Sample
We estimate equation (10) using ordinary least squares, with the head-teacher report of the number
of days absent as our measure of shocks to teacher inputs. Further, since each teacher teaches 5.5
children on average, we cluster this regression at the teacher level. Restricting attention to the
sample of non-movers, the impact of teacher shocks on student learning is given by the coeﬃcient
eα in equation (10).
Tables 5a and 5b report coeﬃcients based on four diﬀerent specifications for English and Math-
ematics. For all specifications, the dependent variable is the change in “knowledge” of the student
(English, table 5a and Math, table 5b) as measured by the standardized score. The coeﬃcients
can therefore be directly interpreted as changes in standard deviations of the original “knowledge”
distribution. In Column 1, we include a variable for the number of days absent in the last month
reported by the head-teacher and a dummy for whether the school is in a rural location. Subsequent
specifications introduce additional controls: Column 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcient including
school characteristics, column 3 introduces teacher characteristics and column 4 includes student
characteristics.15 Recall that including teacher and student characteristics reduces our sample,
since we could not interview teachers absent on the day of the visit. Columns 5-7 reproduce the
results of columns 1-3, but estimated on this reduced sample.
The estimated impact of teacher shocks is stable across diﬀerent specifications, but not across
diﬀerent samples. Looking across from column 4 to column 7 (which all use the same restricted
sample), the coeﬃcients for English vary between -0.033 and -0.035 standard deviations, a variation
of less than 10 percent. The results are remarkably similar for Mathematics, where the variation
is between -0.030 and -0.036. The significance of these results vary; in most specifications they are
significant at either the 5 percent or the 10 percent level of significance.
This stability across specifications and subjects does not hold across samples. Thus, for the
full sample the results for both English and Mathematics are halved to -0.015 (English) and -0.017
(Mathematics), although the estimated impact is still significant at the 5 percent level for English
and the 10 percent level for Mathematics. The comparison between column 1 and column 5 (or
column 2 and column 6) suggests that this change is due to a change in the sample rather than the
inclusion of additional variables. Sticking with the same set of variables but restricting the sample
15School controls include the funding received by the school during the current year (a flow), whether the head-
teacher changed (a change in stock), whether the head of the parent-teacher association changed, the change in
parent-teacher association fees and dummies for whether the school is private (there are four such schools in our
sample) and whether the school is in a rural region (proxying for diﬀerent input prices).
15
to only those for whom we observe teacher and student characteristics increases the coeﬃcients to
the levels given by column 3 and column 4.
What explains the lack of stability across samples? According to the head-teachers reports, the
rate of absenteeism for those absent on the day of the survey is almost twice as high compared
to those who were present (3.1 vs 1.6 ). The reduced sample excludes the more absent teachers.
If the impact of teacher shocks on student learning is linear in the extent of the shock, excluding
these teachers from the sample should not aﬀect our estimates. On the other hand, if the marginal
impact of the shock decreases with the extent of the shock, a prediction that follows directly from a
production function that is concave in teaching inputs, excluding those with severe shocks will lead
to an increase in the size of the estimated impact (we estimate the sharp drop-oﬀ at low levels of
teacher shocks, but not the levelling oﬀ later on). It is plausible that these non-linearities drive the
diﬀerences in estimated impacts across our samples. For both Mathematics and English, we find a
sharp drop-oﬀ in learning as absenteeism rates increase from 0 to 10 percent, but the comparison
between those with 10 percent and those with greater than 10 percent absenteeism rates is less
clear-cut.16 Unfortunately, the small size of our sample does not permit us to investigate these
non-linearities further.
Thus, across the entire sample range, teacher shocks associated with a 5 percent increase in
absenteeism (1 day out of 20) reduce learning achievement by 0.015 and 0.017 standard devia-
tions. Given that average learning during the year in both English and Mathematics was 0.40
standard deviations, the estimated impact is between 3.7 and 4 percent decrease in learning for
every additional day that the teacher was absent among the non-movers. At the 95 percent level of
confidence, the bounds for these estimates are 2.2 to 5.3 percent for English and 1.7 and 6.4 percent
for Mathematics, both of which are compatible with a one-for-one decline in learning achievement.
Using the specifications with teacher controls, and mindful of the accompanying sample selection,
the impact is higher at low levels of the shock, where the marginal eﬀect could be as high as 8
percent declines in learning for shocks associated with a 5 percent increase in absenteeism.
6.1 Robustness to Omitted Variables
Covariate shocks between teachers and students could lead to omitted variable bias in our estimates.
This is particularly plausible in rural settings, where the village may face an unanticipated shock
16Of the 136 teachers associated with the sample of non-movers, head-teachers reported 0 absenteeism for 69
teachers and 10 percent or lower absenteeism rates for 40 during the 30-day recall period. Head-teachers report
absences of greater than 10 percent for 27 teachers. Consequently, most of the variation in our data comes from the
diﬀerence between those with 0 absenteeism and those with 10 percent or lower absenteeism rates.
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leading to greater absence among teachers, but also lower school attendance among pupils. In fact,
Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) show that it is precisely shocks that are covariate across villages and
unanticipated that lead to the largest declines in school participation. Under this scenario, the
coeﬃcient on teacher shocks picks up the additional impact of the shocks on the students, biasing
our estimate away from zero. Fortunately, among the sample of non-movers, 65 percent of the
students come from urban locations. This makes it less likely that covariate shocks are driving our
results.
Stronger evidence comes from looking at the relationship between student and teacher absen-
teeism. To the extent that teacher-level and student-level shocks are covariate, there should be some
association between student and teacher absenteeism. Moreover, including student absenteeism in
the regression should lead to a decrease in the estimated impact of teacher shocks. We do not find
evidence in support.
Table 3 showed that there was no diﬀerence in student absenteeism between teachers who were
less and more absent (1.42 versus 1.47 days). Continuing in the same vein, table 6 computes a
two-way contingency table, where the columns are teachers who were more or less absent and the
rows are students who were more or less absent. A simple measure of association test cannot
reject the null hypothesis of no assortative matching–that is, there appears to be no correlation
between student absenteeism and teacher absenteeism in our estimated sample. Finally, columns 4
in tables 5a and 5b include the average number of days that the student was absent as an additional
regressor. While the impact of student absenteeism is large and significant in the case of English
and less so for Mathematics, there is no change in the estimated impact of teacher shocks on
learning. Thus, to the extent that covariate shocks will be picked up (at least to some extent)
by student absenteeism, confidence in our results is strengthened by both the lack of correlation
between student and teacher absence on the one hand, and the stability of the estimates to the
inclusion of this additional regressor.
6.2 Robustness to Household Constraints and Specification Bias
A further worry is that households are constrained in their response to (poor) teaching inputs.
In and of itself, this does not bias the coeﬃcient. However, if in addition, unobserved teacher
characteristics have a cumulative eﬀect on student learning, the estimate could pick up this eﬀect
as well. Suppose unmotivated teachers are more absent. As long as the lack of motivation aﬀects
only the scores in the first year (that is, it is a one-time negative shock), it does not impact on
the change in scores between the first and the second year. However, if teacher motivation aﬀects
how much students learn in every year, our measure of teacher shocks would pick up both intrinsic
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motivation as well as time-varying shocks to teaching inputs. Even with such cumulative eﬀects, the
estimated coeﬃcient is still identified if households are able to respond to teacher motivation–the
impact of lower motivation would be attenuated through greater household participation. We have
less to say about how the combination of cumulative teacher eﬀects and household-level constraints
may bias our coeﬃcients. To estimate such persistent eﬀects requires data from at least 3 points
in time, and this is a hard requirement in low-income countries. Nevertheless, suggestive evidence
along two fronts indicates that these persistent impacts are not critical to our findings.
First, to the extent that teacher eﬀects are cumulative, we should also find that the first-year
test scores are correspondingly low for students associated with more absent teachers. This is not
the case. Table 7 reports results of a regression of baseline test scores on the number of days
absent and teacher characteristics. Columns 1 and 2, and 5 and 6 report coeﬃcients for the full
sample, while the other columns report results for the non-mover sample. For both Mathematics
and English, we fail to find any association between baseline test scores and the head-teacher report
of absenteeism. For both subjects, the point estimates and the significance is very low.
Second, we find no supporting evidence in observables. Returning to tables 5a and 5b, tests for
the joint significance of teacher characteristics report F-statistics in the range of 0.06 (English) and
0.72 (Mathematics), both of which are insignificant at the 50-percent level of confidence. Further,
the inclusion (or not) of teacher characteristics does not alter the estimated impact of teacher
shocks.
7 Movers: A Puzzle and Potential Reconciliations
In the case of the non-movers, the choice of sample “diﬀerences-out” the non-time varying un-
observable inputs of the teacher and the estimate accurately captures the eﬀect of time-varying
shocks to teaching inputs on learning. However, our sample of non-movers is diﬀerent from the
movers (see table 3): since the policy of teachers remaining with the same cohort of students was
implemented in larger schools, the non-movers tend to be concentrated in urban areas and come
from households that are one-third of a standard deviation richer on average. A priori, one may
expect that the eﬀect of teacher shocks is lower in the sample of non-movers compared to movers–
to the extent that wealth and urbanization capture substitution possibilities (more wealthy and
more urban households are more likely to hire private tutors), negative shocks should have a larger
impact on movers than non-movers.
Our results, however, do not support such a view. Tables 8a and 8b replicate the specifica-
tions reported in tables 5a and 5b; in addition, we include an additional specification for the full
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sample where we interact a dummy variable for whether the student was a non-mover with the
head-teacher report of absence. Both in the separate and the nested specifications, head-teachers
reports of absence have no impact on learning among children who moved. Moreover, in the nested
specification, the coeﬃcient and significance for the non-movers sample is identical to that reported
before. We discuss three potential reconciliations for this result.
7.1 Sampling Diﬀerences
Table 9 explores whether intrinsic diﬀerences in the sample account for our results, by excluding
children with very diﬀerent backgrounds from the nested specification. We implement this by the
analog of a propensity score matching technique. We first estimate the probability that a student is
a mover based on household, teacher and school characteristics and use this regression to predict the
probability of moving. We then look only at the area of “common support”, that is, we only keep in
the sample those children whose predicted probabilities are found in both the sample of movers and
the sample of children with same-teachers. Again, we find no diﬀerence in the estimated coeﬃcients
for English and a decline in Mathematics among the non-movers; the estimated coeﬃcients for the
movers remains very small and insignificant.
7.2 Selective Matching and Precautionary Investment
Section 3 and 4 discussed two other channels for this result–selective matching and precautionary
investment. In particular, if cov(∆mqt , µt) > 0, i.e., time-varying shocks are positively correlated
with changes in unobserved teacher characteristics, our results are biased towards zero for the
movers. Alternatively, even if cov(∆mqt , µt) = 0, the estimated impact will be less for movers
compared to non-movers in the presence of precautionary investment by households.
It is hard to assess how plausible this is, and narratives for both channels are possible. Although
we cannot directly test the relevance and importance of the selection versus the precautionary
investment eﬀect, one option is to use observable past teacher characteristics to check whether
changes in observed teacher characteristics satisfy the covariance requirement. That is, we can
check whether among the movers, positive movements were correlated with higher absence reports.
For two important variables–whether the teacher holds a certificate and teacher experience–we do
not find any correlation between teacher shocks and movements. Of course, it could still be that the
correlation is in unobservables that do not co-vary positively with these observed characteristics;
verifying (or not) the importance of selective matching versus precautionary investment remains
an important agenda for our future research.
19
8 Conclusion and Caveats
This paper uses a household optimization framework to identify the impact of teacher-level shocks
on student’s learning gains. Our data from Zambia show that shocks to teacher inputs have a
substantial eﬀect on student learning. In our preferred specification, shocks associated with a
5 percent increase in the teacher’s absence rate resulted in a decline in learning of 3.75 percent
(English) and 4 percent (Mathematics) of the average gains across the two years. The identification
strategy is based on a restriction of the sample, whereby we focus only on those students who
remained with the same-teacher in the two concurrent years that they were tested. This allows us
to rule out changes in unobserved teacher characteristics as a confounding factor in the estimation
procedure. We argue that the estimates thus arrived at are robust to omitted variable and mis-
specification bias.
What are the implications of this finding? To the extent that improving educational outcomes
are a policy priority, governments should concentrate on providing resources at the school-level
that cannot easily be substituted for by households. In a previous paper (Das and others 2004),
we documented that educational funding is an important determinant of learning achievement.
However, because schools spend the money received from the government on resources such as
textbooks, there is a high degree of substitutability between public and private funding. Increases
in the former crowd-out the latter. Contrariwise, this paper argues that households are unable to
insure themselves against teacher-level shocks. Moreover, the estimated impact of teacher-level and
student-level shocks are of roughly the same magnitude. This confirms findings from other studies
that teachers matter and further, raises the possibility that insurance at the school-level may be
more beneficial than at the household-level. This is a policy priority worth investigating further.
Throughout we have assumed that the learning decline is the impact of negative shocks that
result in higher teacher absence rather than the impact of absenteeism per se. Our interpretation
is that the learning declines reflect the joint eﬀect of from time away from class, decreased teaching
quality when in class and less lesson preparation when at home. In attributing all teacher absence
to negative shocks, we have probably been overly generous–it is likely that at least some portion of
teacher absence is due to shirking rather than illness. If so, incentive schemes should work. In the
United States, Jacobson’s work (Jacobson 1989 and Jacobson 1991) shows that payment incentives
do lead to declines in absenteeism. However, the welfare impacts are less certain.
Jacobson (1989) documents how a payment incentive scheme led to a decline in teacher absen-
teeism. Nevertheless, one year later a fact-finding mission concludes that:
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“While the District’s attendance statistics for the past several school years may lead some to
conclude that attendance improved (...) the fact finder does not believe the record before him estab-
lished that improved attendance rate (...) raised the quality of teachers or teaching in the District.
In fact, the District and Association expressed their agreement that they knew of no way to mea-
sure the eﬀectiveness of a sick teacher who came to work to assure receiving a higher share of EIT
money vs. that of a sick teacher who stayed home to recuperate while a substitute taught his/her
classes (...) I conclude that an attendance based criterion for the 1987/88 EIT distribution simply
would not serve to promote the "excellence in teaching" envisioned by the State Legislature and the
Governor (PERB 1988: 9-10).”
The situation in low-income countries may be very diﬀerent. Certainly, studies in India (Chaud-
hury and others 2005) suggest that teacher absenteeism is largely due to shirking rather than ill-
ness. Jacobson’s work however, cautions us in extrapolating views from one continent to another.
If teachers in Zambia and other Sub-Saharan countries are absent because they shirk and if incen-
tive schemes and greater accountability lead both to greater attendance and better performance,
then such schemes can lead to better learning outcomes. However, if teacher’s utility functions are
altruistic so that most absenteeism is “genuine”, incentive schemes might hurt teacher motivation.
This conflict between treating teachers as “professionals” who respond to monetary incentives and
thinking of them as “dedicated to student’s needs” remains at the center of a contentious debate
in the United States. Although research in low-income countries is at a nascent stage, with ab-
senteeism rates approaching 25 percent in some countries, steps towards a deeper understanding is
critical.
Our findings also raise a methodological issue. The results obtained on the cohort of children
who stayed with the same teacher, do not extend to the entire sample. The policy of retaining the
same teacher for the student-cohort was implemented only for larger schools, so non-movers come
from more urban schools where the teachers are better (more experienced and better trained),
families are richer and parents are more educated. With better access to markets for private
tuition and home schooling, we expected the impact of teacher shocks to be lower among the
sample of children who are non-movers. Intriguingly we found no impact of teacher shocks on
student learning among the movers in our sample. We suggested two reasons for this finding. If the
sample of children who switched teachers were not randomly assigned, selective matching might
bias our estimate. A second interesting possibility was the role of uncertainty in teaching inputs on
household investments. The model shows that greater uncertainty in teaching inputs leads to an
ex ante response among households through greater precautionary spending. Faced with greater
uncertainty in teaching inputs, the movers would have higher precautionary spending and thus be
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less susceptible to ex post shocks.
We would have liked to directly test which of these mechanisms is responsible for the diﬀerence
in estimates. Do households really undertake precautionary schooling investments? That is, do
parents of movers spend more time or money with their children than those of non-movers? Un-
fortunately, our data on household inputs does not allow us to investigate this directly. Although
we surveyed households matched to these schools (see Das and others 2004a), these were all rural
households and our sample of non-movers is too small to draw any meaningful inferences.
If we believe that households play an important role in determining educational outcomes
of their children, this paper suggests a direction for future work. Using a model allowing for
household responses to teacher and school inputs allows for richer insights than standard production
function approaches. The impact of current year shocks on learning achievement depends on other
sources of uncertainty (non time-varying attributes of the teacher in this paper) and this has
important implications for future evaluation work.17 Currently there is little research on the link
between household and school inputs, and none on the precautionary motive discussed in this paper.
Evidence either way would be helpful.
17Suppose that an experiment were designed to study the eﬀect of absenteeism on learning achievement. The
”treatment on the treated” estimator will represent the average eﬀect, averaged across children who changed and
remained with the same teacher. This paper suggests that the external validity of the experiment may be compromised
due to this important source of heterogeneity–an empirical implication is to try and capture information on this and
other changes that have occurred during the year of the experiment.
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The word processed describes informally produced works that may not be commonly available
through library systems.
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9 Appendix 1: Measuring Teacher Absence
We collected a spot measure of teacher absence by checking attendance on the day of the survey
for all teachers in small schools and a non-random sample of 20 teachers in larger schools. Since
this is a prevalence rate, a spot absence rate of 20 percent does not distinguish between all teachers
being absent 20 percent of the time, or half the teachers being absent 40 percent of the time. If half
of the teachers have an absenteeism incidence of 40 percent and the other half are always present,
to distinguish between the two types of teachers with 95 percent confidence, we would require at
least 6 visits (assuming that absence follows a Bernouli process). We also collected a self-reported
absence profile over the last 30 days for teachers matched to pupils. This measure is biased because
it is missing for teachers absent on the day. Also, it is plausible that low-quality teachers may
report absenteeism in diﬀerent ways than high-quality teachers.
The diﬀerences between the measures appear to be in line with expectations regarding the bias
and noise entailed in self-reported or spot absenteeism measures. The extent of these diﬀerences
can be partially assessed by using the sampling diﬀerences between the diﬀerent measures of absen-
teeism. For instance we can check for a selection eﬀect in the self-reported measure (we don’t have
a report for those who were absent on the day) by comparing the reports of the head-teacher for the
sample who were present on the day of the survey and those who were not. Using the head-teacher’s
report, teachers who were absent on the day of the survey miss an average of 2.39 days compared
to 1.5 days for teachers who were present. This diﬀerence is significant at the 5-percent level, also
suggesting problems with the spot measure based on those absent at the time of the visit.
We also find evidence of reporting bias in the self-reported measure. To investigate the reporting
biases of the self-report, we divide teachers into those who had pupils with high and low learning
gains, and examine the correlation between the self-report and the head-teacher report for these
two groups. If there are self-reporting biases, the correlation between the two reports should be
higher for the teachers with high-performing children compared to teachers with low-learning gains.
The correlation between self-reported and head-teacher for the “good” teachers is 0.39 compared to
0.28 for the “bad” teachers. Gains in English suggest a similar, albeit weaker result. This pattern
is broadly consistent with “bad” teachers under-reporting duration of absence assuming that the
head-teacher’s report is the true measure.
10 Appendix 2: Ex Ante Risk and Household Investment
To develop the circumstances under which greater ex ante risk leads to larger household investment,
we introduce risk in a specific way. Let mt = m
q
t + ha + µt, whereby ha = a > 0 if the teacher is
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of high quality, and ha = −a if the teacher is of low quality. Increases in a would then imply an
increase in risk in the sense of a standard increase in mean-preserving spread. A suﬃcient condition
for household spending on education to increase in risk is that
∂U
∂TSt
πt is decreasing and convex in
mt. We continue to impose (as in Das and others (2004a)) the following assumptions:
[fA1] Household utility is additively separable and of the CRRA form.
[fA2] TSt = (1− δ)TSt−1 + F (wt, zt, µ, η) where the Hessian of F (.) is negative semi-definite.
Under [fA1] marginal utility is defined as TS−ρt , with ρ the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
Using [fA2] and the implicit function theorem with (5), we have
dπt
dmt
= −Fztmt
F 2zt
T 0 if Fztmt U 0 (11)
The sign of the cross partial depends on whether the household can respond to changes to teacher
inputs. If Fztmt = 0, households are unable to respond to changes in teacher inputs. This might be a
consequence of credit constraints, inability of parents to substitute either via a lack of ability/time
and the absence of markets for private tuition. If, however, households are able to respond to
changes in teacher inputs and household and teacher inputs are technical substitutes (Fztmt < 0),
increases in teacher inputs at t will increase the relative user-cost of boosting cognitive achievement
at t. The reverse is true if teacher and household inputs are technical complements (Fztmt > 0).
It follows directly that
∂U
∂TSt
πt will be decreasing in mt if teacher and household inputs are technical
substitutes and if households are risk averse:
d
∂U
∂TSt
πt
dmt
=
− ∂πt∂mt .
∂U
∂TSt +
∂2U
∂TS2t
.Fmt .πt
π2t
< 0 (12)
In (12), the first term in the numerator is negative if inputs are technical substitutes and the
second term is negative if households are risk averse. Furthermore, it can be shown that a suﬃcient
condition for
∂U
∂TSt
πt to be convex in teacher inputs is that inputs are technical substitutes, households
are risk averse, the marginal utility of additional cognitive achievement is convex, and the user-cost
is concave in m (it increases at a decreasing rate). Convex marginal utility is satisfied under CRRA
.The user-cost is concave in m if FzFmmz ≥ 2(Fzm)218.
18Concavity of the user-cost is not a necessary condition: even with convexity of user-cost, suﬃciently high risk
aversion or substantial convexity of marginal utility could result in the convexity of
∂U
∂TSt
πt
.
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Tables 
Table 1: School, Teacher and Pupil Characteristics 
Full Sample 
School Characteristics 
Number of male teachers 8.45 
(0.43) 
Number of female teachers 14.16 
(1.09) 
Proportion of schools in rural location 0.48 
(0.04) 
Proportion of schools that are private 0.03 
(0.01) 
Number of observations 177 
Current Teacher Characteristics 
Proportion rural 0.27 
(0.02) 
Proportion male 0.42 
(0.03) 
Proportion with > 5 years of experience 0.52 
(0.03) 
Proportion with teacher certificate 0.81 
(0.02) 
Days absent in the previous month 1.76 
(0.21) 
Number of observations 402 
Student Characteristics 
Proportion students living with both parents 0.64 
(0.01) 
Proportion, mother has more than primary schooling 0.55 
(0.01) 
Proportion, father has more than primary schooling 0.72 
(0.01) 
Proportion living within 15 minutes of school 0.44 
(0.01) 
Asset index -0.05 
(0.02) 
Student Absenteeism 1.52 
(0.04) 
Average learning gains in Mathematics (standard 
deviations of standardized score) 
0.42 
Average learning gains in English 
(standard deviations of standardized score) 
0.40 
Number of observations 2190 
Note: The data used to construct this table comes from surveys of schools, matched teachers present during the 
survey team visit, and sampled pupils. 
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Table 2: Head Teacher Report of Absenteeism 
 # episodes Fraction of HT 
absence 
episodes 
Mean days 
absent 
Median 
days 
absent 
Own illness 106.00 0.35 3.77 2.00 
Illness in family 36.00 0.12 3.67 2.00 
Away on training 13.00 0.04 10.23 5.00 
Travel to town 27.00 0.09 1.74 1.00 
Funeral 45.00 0.15 4.67 3.00 
Other reasons 46.00 0.15 4.70 2.50 
Leave 10.00 0.03 19.00 20.00 
Official work/workshops 21.00 0.07 4.86 5.00 
Not absent in last month 420.00 - 0.00 0.00 
Total 724.00 1.00 1.98 0.00 
Note: The data used to construct this table comes from head teacher reports of absence for teachers matched to the 
pupils tested in 2001 and 2002. Head  teachers were asked to report the primary reason for any absence episode in the 
30 days prior to the survey team visit. 
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Table 3: Teacher and Pupil Characteristics, Non-mover Sample 
By Head Teacher report of absence 
 Full Sample Sample with Teacher 
Characteristics 
Sample with Teacher 
and Pupil 
Characteristics 
Current Teacher 
Characteristics 
Teachers 
Not 
Absent 
Teacher 
Absent 
Diff. 
Significant 
Teacher 
not 
absent 
Teacher 
Absent 
Teacher 
not absent 
Teacher 
Absent 
Proportion rural 0.20 
(0.05) 
0.14 
(0.04) 
No 0.17 
(0.06) 
0.14 
(0.05) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
Proportion male 0.33 
(0.06) 
0.22 
(0.06) 
No 0.28 
(0.07) 
0.17 
(0.06) 
0.27 
(0.07) 
0.11 
(0.05) 
Proportion with > 
5 years of 
experience 
0.75 
(0.06) 
0.63 
(0.07) 
No 0.74 
(0.06) 
0.62 
(0.08) 
0.78 
(0.07) 
0.60 
(0.08) 
Proportion with 
teacher certificate 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
No 0.98 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.97 
(0.03) 
0.97 
(0.03) 
Number of 
observations 
55 59  47 42 37 35 
 
       
Student 
Characteristics 
Teachers 
Not 
Absent 
Teacher 
Absent 
Diff. 
Significant 
Teacher 
Not 
Absent 
Teacher 
Absent 
Teacher 
Not 
Absent 
Teacher 
Absent 
Proportion living 
with both parents 
0.64 
(0.03) 
0.61 
(0.03) 
No 0.63 
(0.03) 
0.62 
(0.04) 
0.66 
(0.03) 
0.63 
(0.04) 
Proportion, 
mother has more 
than primary 
schooling 
0.60 
(0.03) 
0.67 
(0.03) 
No 0.60 
(0.03) 
0.64 
(0.04) 
0.64 
(0.03) 
0.66 
(0.04) 
Proportion, father 
has more than 
primary schooling 
0.77 
(0.03) 
0.77 
(0.03) 
No 0.77 
(0.03) 
0.75 
(0.03) 
0.80 
(0.03) 
0.76 
(0.03) 
Proportion living 
within 15 minutes 
of school 
0.40 
(0.03) 
0.50 
(0.03) 
Yes 0.39 
(0.03) 
0.48 
(0.04) 
0.40 
(0.03) 
0.48 
(0.04) 
Asset index 0.25 
(0.06) 
0.26 
(0.06) 
No 0.26 
(0.06) 
0.21 
(0.07) 
0.33 
(0.07) 
0.27 
(0.08) 
Student 
Absenteeism 
1.42 
(0.10) 
1.47 
(0.15) 
No 1.42 
(0.10) 
1.57 
(0.17) 
1.32 
(0.11) 
1.50 
(0.16) 
Number of 
observations 
271 280  238 192 203 165 
Note: The data used to construct this table comes from surveys of matched teachers teaching the same cohort of pupils in 
2001 and 2002 who were present during the survey team visit. Pupil characteristics are shown for those pupils taught by the 
same teacher in both years 
. 
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Table 4: School, Teacher and Pupil Characteristics 
By Same Teacher Status 
School Characteristics Non-Same Teacher 
Schools 
Same Teacher 
Schools 
Difference 
significant 
Number of male teachers 7.29 
(0.51) 
9.52 
(0.66) 
Yes 
Number of female teachers 7.94 
(1.12) 
19.90 
(1.61) 
Yes 
Proportion of schools in rural location 0.64 
(0.05) 
0.34 
(0.05) 
Yes 
Proportion of schools that are private 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
No 
Number of observations 86 91  
 
   
Current Teacher Characteristics New Teachers Same Teacher Difference 
Significant 
Proportion rural 0.31 
(0.03) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
Yes 
Proportion male 0.48 
(0.03) 
0.31 
(0.04) 
Yes 
Proportion with > 5 years of experience 0.44 
(0.03) 
0.70 
(0.04) 
Yes 
Proportion with teacher certificate 0.74 
(0.03) 
0.97 
(0.02) 
Yes 
Days absent in the previous month 1.68 
(0.25) 
1.94 
(0.38) 
No 
Number of observations 283 119  
 
   
Student Characteristics Movers Non-movers Difference 
Significant 
Proportion living with both parents 0.64 
(0.01) 
0.62 
(0.02) 
No 
Proportion, mother has more than 
primary schooling 
0.53 
(0.01) 
0.62 
(0.02) 
Yes 
Proportion, father has more than 
primary schooling 
0.70 
(0.01) 
0.76 
(0.02) 
Yes 
Proportion living within 15 minutes of 
school 
0.45 
(0.01) 
0.44 
(0.02) 
No 
Asset index -0.13 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
Yes 
Student Absenteeism 1.55 
(0.05) 
1.43 
(0.08) 
No 
Number of observations 1592 598  
Note: The data used to construct this table comes from surveys of schools, matched teachers present during the survey 
team visit, and sampled students. 
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APPENDIX 3: Full Sample Characteristics 
 
Table 1: Teacher and Pupil Characteristics, Full Sample 
By Head Teacher report of Absence 
Current Teacher Characteristics Absent 
Teachers 
Teachers Not 
Absent 
Difference 
Significant 
Proportion rural 0.28 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
No 
Proportion male 0.43 
(0.03) 
0.40 
(0.04) 
No 
Proportion with > 5 years of experience 0.52 
(0.04) 
0.53 
(0.04) 
No 
Proportion with teacher certificate 0.77 
(0.03) 
0.89 
(0.03) 
Yes 
Number of observations 210 164  
 
   
Student Characteristics Absent Teachers Teachers Not 
Absent 
Difference 
Significant 
Proportion living with both parents 0.64 
(0.01) 
0.64 
(0.02) 
No 
Proportion, mother has more than 
primary schooling 
0.55 
(0.01) 
0.56 
(0.02) 
No 
Proportion, father has more than primary 
schooling 
0.71 
(0.01) 
0.73 
(0.02) 
No 
Proportion living within 15 minutes of 
school 
0.44 
(0.01) 
0.47 
(0.02) 
No 
Asset Index -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
No 
Student Absenteeism 1.49 
(0.05) 
1.61 
(0.07) 
No 
Number of observations 1182 909  
Note: The data used to construct this table comes from surveys of matched teachers present during the survey team visit 
and sampled pupils. Pupil characteristics are calculated for the entire sample of pupils tested in 2001 and 2002 
 
 
